Its been a while since we blogged on business tenancies so here goes.
In Somerfield Stores Ltd v Spring (Sutton Coldfield) Ltd the tenant held a supermarket and adjoining land under three commercial leases which expired in March 2008. The year before the expiry the tenant had served a section 26 notice pursuant to the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 requesting a new tenancy. However the landlord served counter notices stating that it would oppose the grant of the tenancies under section 30 of the 1954 Act on the ground that the landlord intended to demolish or reconstruct the premises on the termination of the current tenancies. The tenant therefore applied to the court for the new leases.
The Landlord subsequently went into administration but the tenant was granted permission to continue with the proceedings and applied for summary judgement against the landlords ground of opposition. Initially the tenant’s application was refused but the tenant was granted permission to appeal.
At appeal the landlord contended that the date at which the landlord’s intention to demolish or reconstruct must be shown to exist is the date of the substantive trial of the landlord’s ground of objection, not the hearing of the application for the summary judgement. The tenant contended that the hearing of the summary application would establish whether the landlord had a real prospect of establishing a cause of action or defence at a future trial date not whether or not the intention exists.
The court held that the summary judgement would deal with the finding of fact only, that is whether the landlord intended to rebuild or not and you can not do this effectively using the summary judgement procedure. When a fact is contested the parties are usually cross examined but a summary judgement application is done on paper and as such the facts are going to be difficult to establish. Therefore the intention will not be established at the summary hearing and a further hearing will no doubt be required.
It was therefore in the courts view that the date at which the intention had to exist was the date of the trial. At a substantive trial evidence can be tested and facts found for the purpose of a final determination one way or the other of the landlord’s ground for opposition.
The logic behind this decision makes perfect sense from a litigation point of view. If the tenant was permitted to continue with the summary application as claimed this would simple raise costs for what is already a costly process and could no doubt result in tenants attempting to use this in order to force landlords to settle.
Filed under: England & Wales, FLW Article, comment, commercial lease, legislation
28 April, 2011 • 15:03 1
Mobile Homes and Article 8!
In Murphy v Wyatt the Court of Appeal Wyatt brought in a mobile home to replace a dilapidated caravan after her partner Mr Barrett died. The caravan was located on just under 2 acres of rough pasture which the Wyatt’s partner used for his livery business. The landlord served a notice to quit in 2009.
Mr Barrett entered into a oral weekly tenancy in 1975 and in 1979 he moved a caravan onto the plot and began sleeping in the same from time to time. His relationship with Wyatt began in the mid-80s and in 1989 Wyatt moved in with Mr Barrett. In 1996, Mr Barrett then ceased using the land for his livery business.
Mr Barrett then sought a certificate of lawful use for the caravan in 2002 in order to claim Housing benefit. Upon Mr Barrett’s death in 2002 Wyatt continued living in the caravan and paid rent with Murphy’s consent.
The caravan was then replaced in 2007 with a mobile home. Wyatt failed to obtain planning permission and failed to obtain Murphy’s consent. The mobile home was on the same original location but was slightly larger than the caravan. Again the certificate of lawful use was obtained.
The issue before the Court was therefore did Wyatt have security of tenure under the Mobile Homes Act 1983.
The court held that Wyatt did not and found in favour of Murphy. The reasoning for the courts decision was that the 1983 Act could not apply to a tenancy where planning permission was sought after the tenancy term began. The court held
The court also held that they did not believe that the 1983 Act could apply to more land than the land on which the mobile home is to be sited plus any garden or other amenity land. If the Act applied to land other than the pitch that was for the tenants use this would run into “serious conflict” with the legislation protecting business and even agricultural tenants.
Wyatt sought permission to appeal but was refused. The court did however state that if any further applications for possession of this site are made the courts may need to consider Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Whilst we can not fault the court for its reasoning it is unfortunate that the issue of Article 8 was dealt with so swiftly and briefly. With the influx of cases recently suggesting that Article 8 is only applicable to social landlords there are fears among private landlords that the scope of Article 8 is going to be extended and some certainty would have certainly been welcome.
Filed under: England & Wales, FLW Article, comment, legislation, litigation, planning, tenancy agreements