Spencer v Taylor [ 2013] EWCA Civ 1600.
The Court of Appeal has recently revisited the requirements of section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 and its application to statutory periodic tenancies, which in due course is likely to significantly alter and simplify the way notice is served on statutory periodic tenants of an Assured Shorthold Tenancy (AST).
The Landlord, Mr Spencer, served notice on his tenant, Miss Taylor who was on a weekly statutory periodic tenancy following on from a fixed term agreement. From the transcript of the judgment it would seem that the notice was sent in the usual format that most agents use, and was a “standard” section 21(4)(a) notice. (There is no statutory required standard form but a customary standard form has developed).
The expiry date was in the format approved in the case of Elias v Spencer, i.e. it required possession “after 1/1/2012 or (b) at the end of your period of tenancy which will end next after the expiration of two months from the service upon you of this notice” (i.e. the “saving provision” as approved in Lower Street Properties v Jones.
Possession proceedings were brought once the notice expired. The tenant defended the proceedings arguing that the given date of expiry of the section 21 notice was not the last day of a period of her tenancy and that the saving provision gave a second date, which invalidated the first. In other words a continuation of the interpretation of the requirements of section 21 (4)(a) Housing Act 1988.
The tenant defended successfully in the first instance. The Landlord appealed successfully in the High Court. The Tenant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal
The appeal judge hearing the tenant’s appeal in the Court of Appeal, Lewison LJ, concentrated on the requirements of section 21 as a whole, starting with section 21(1) finding:
1. The fixed term tenancy came to an end on its expiry date for the purposes of section 21(1)(a).
2. No other tenancy had come into existence save for a statutory periodic tenancy (which we now all know is a new tenancy following Superstrike!).
3. The landlord gave the tenant two months’ notice.
All three conditions of s21(1) were satisfied and therefore the court could give possession
To go back (briefly) to basics: section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 provides the mechanism by which a landlord can recover possession of his property that has been let on an AST. A court can grant a possession order under section 21 (1), or under section 21 (4) if certain conditions are satisfied.
Prior to the judgment in this case, the courts have been finding that section 21(1)(b) applied only to serving notice during the fixed term of an AST. This line of thinking is supported by section 21(2), which provides that notice may be given under section 21(1) before or on the day the fixed term comes to an end, even if a statutory periodic tenancy arises part way through the notice period.
Once a statutory periodic tenancy had arisen, it was understood that section 21(4)(a) applied: “without prejudice to any such right as is referred to in [s21(1)], a court shall make an order for possession of a [property] let on an AST which is a periodic tenancy.
The requirements of section 21(4)(a) are that: “…the landlord…has given to the tenant a notice in writing stating that, after a date specified in the notice, being the last day of a period of the tenancy and not earlier than two months after the date the notice was given, possession…is required by virtue of this section”; and “…that the date specified…is not earlier that the earliest day….the tenancy could be brought to and end by a notice to quit…”
It is well known in the industry that adhering to the requirements of section 21(4)(a) have been tricky to the point of ridiculousness. Possession claims have historically been thrown out of court simply because the landlord required possession on the wrong date, or asked for possession “on” a date, rather than “after” (see Fernandez v McDonald  EWCA Civ 1219). There has been much case law interpreting section 21 (4)(a), some of it to alleviate the harsher requirements of the section, ( see for example Lower Street Properties v Jones in which the court approved the use of the “saving provision” to avoid the risk of putting an incorrect date on the notice).
The law therefore is now that a landlord wishing to gain possession of his property let on an AST which was a fixed term and has become periodic needs to give only two months’ notice in writing, pursuant to section 21 (1)(b) and need not concern himself with rental periods.
So what about section 21 (4)(a) and the case law surrounding it? Fernandez v McDonald  EWCA Civ 1219, the leading case that requires notices under s21(4)(a) to demand possession “after” rather than “on” a date? Lord Justice Lewison considered that that case fell “squarely within section 21(1) rather than section 21(4)”. However he emphasised that his comments on Fernandez v McDonald were not part of the “ratio decidendi” of the case ( i.e. not part of his judgment). Therefore the case law surrounding section 21 (4) ( a) remains good law, but it is section 21 (1)(b) that governed Spencer and Taylor, and by extension any notice served on a periodic tenancy ( statutory or otherwise) that was once a fixed term.
This judgment is surprising perhaps in that it has come apparently out of the blue, when agents and solicitors up and down the country have accepted ( if reluctantly) the difficulties and specific requirements of serving valid notice on statutory periodic tenancies. However it is well known that there has been significant ( and many would say understandable) criticism of the section 21 (4)(a) requirements and so the idea that the Court of Appeal has moved to simplify things is not so surprising. Further, Lewison LJ’s interpretation is of section 21 is not new – it is just new to the courts.
On the face of it then, Spencer and Taylor has removed the onerous requirements of section 21 (4)(a) from fixed term ASTs that have become periodic. Gone is the need for the saving provision lest the date of expiry be wrong. Gone too is the need to work out what is the “period” of the tenancy when the rent day does not match the beginning and end dates of the fixed term. Instead the landlord/agent simply needs to ensure proper service of the notice according to the terms of the tenancy agreement, and to ensure that he gives at least two months notice in writing as if serving the notice during the fixed term of the tenancy in accordance with section 21(1)(b).
However, some words of caution:
Although this Court of Appeal judgment is good law today this point may be appealed to the Supreme Court and may be overturned in the next year or two. A notice which satisfies section 21 (4)(a) will also satisfy the looser requirements of section 21 (1)(b). Most tenants give back possession and do not quibble over the validity of notices, but if they do, possession claims are usually done on the paper (accelerated) procedure or a 5 minute possession hearing with a District Judge. Court of Appeal judgments take time to trickle down to the lower courts and do you really want to have to set yourself up for an argument or risk an adjournment when you could just serve notice to expire at the end of a rental period?
Tenants wishing to serve notice are still bound by the common law rules which would mean that if they are on for example, a quarterly periodic tenancy, their notice period must still run for a clear quarter and expire at the end of a rental period ( or on the day rent is due). Spencer v Taylor gives landlords a much easier way of serving notice while leaving the tenants with much more onerous requirements.
So after breathing a sigh of relief that we can all forget about section 21 (4)(a) in practice we would suggest that, in light of the above, agents might like to keep the practice of serving notices that comply with section 21 (4)(a), at least for the near future.
Section 21(4) a will continue to apply to contractual periodic tenancies which never had an initial fixed term, and to tenancy agreements which provide for an initial term to continue on a contractual periodic basis . The latter may become more prevalent following the Superstrike ruling as a way of avoiding the need to serve prescribed information, and it should be noted that for the purposes of section 21 (1)(a ) the tenancy will not have come to an end at the end of the fixed term and therefore section 21 (1) (b) will not apply.
In conclusion, the ruling in Spencer v Taylor is good law and should in the long run make serving notice on tenants much simpler. However for the moment our advice is that if you do change your systems to serve section 21 (1)(b) for all but contractual periodic ASTs, you should do so knowing that the courts might take some persuading that the notice is validly served. You will also have to keep an eye out for any Supreme Court reversals. If you are prepared for this then fine, otherwise it might be easier to let others beat the path first.
Filed under: England & Wales, contracts, Housing Act 1988, legislation, litigation, possession, procedure